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ATTEMPTING TO DISCUSS RACE IN
BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
COURSES AND SEMINARS
CHERYL L. WADEt
I have taught business and corporate law courses and
seminars at two New York area law schools for slightly more
than a decade and have confronted several interesting
challenges in the process. These challenges have varied
according to the interests and personal backgrounds of my
students. In some years, there was a critical mass of students
anxious to dive into the discussions of corporate citizenship,
social responsibility, and communitarianism that I introduced
throughout the semester. At other times, the critical mass
remained silent, stoically waiting for me to resume consideration
of economic theory and shareholder primacy-the things that to
them really mattered in Business Organizations and Corporate
Governance classes.
The challenges of teaching corporate social responsibility
and good corporate citizenship have shifted as political and
social climates have changed in New York, the United States,
and around the world.' I discuss some of those challenges in this
t Harold F. McNiece Professor of Law, St. John's University School of Law.
1 For example, I visited at St. John's University School of Law in Queens, New
York, in the fall of 2001. My Business Organizations course and Corporate
Governance and Accountability seminar were canceled in the days immediately
following the September 11 attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.
When classes resumed, I crossed the Triboro Bridge from Manhattan and glanced at
the place where the World Trade Center once stood. I had smelled the smoke from
the site for several days at this point. I was not able to return to our discussion of
the demand requirement for the filing of shareholder derivative suits. Instead, we
talked about the tragedy, the human suffering, and our own pain. Eventually, our
discussion encompassed corporate citizenship, social responsibility, and the role
firms would play in the long aftermath of September 11.
A year later, after joining the St. John's faculty, I again taught Business
Organizations and Corporate Governance and Accountability. My students readily
saw the relevance of discussing corporate citizenship, ethics, and social
responsibility throughout the semester as the facts unfolded of accounting fraud,
insider trading, and breach of fiduciary duty at companies such as Enron,
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Article. My primary focus, however, is the challenge of talking
about race in business and corporate law courses and seminars.
I write about race and corporations because I see economic,
business, and workplace issues as the primary elements for legal
and organizational reform that attempt to move this nation
closer to racial equity. 2 Writing about race, corporate law, and
corporate governance has been far easier for me than discussing
race and corporations in the classroom. Obviously, students
expect to discuss race in my Law and Race seminar or in my
Issues in Race, Gender and the Law seminar.3 They do not
expect to talk about race in the basic corporations course or in
my Corporate Governance and Accountability seminar.
In past years, I suspect that some of my students felt
ambushed when I discussed race in both the basic corporations
course and in the Corporate Accountability seminar. The
expressions on some faces registered surprise that I raised the
topic of race in corporations-a course in which I am sure they
WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco, and ImClone.
2 See generally Cheryl L. Wade, Comparisons Between Enron and Other Types
of Corporate Misconduct: Compliance with Law and Ethical Decision Making as the
Best Form of Public Relations, 1 SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 97 (2002) (comparing
the public's reaction to the Enron scandal to the public's reaction to charges of racial
discrimination in the corporate work environment); Cheryl L. Wade, Corporate
Governance as Corporate Social Responsibility: Empathy and Race Discrimination,
76 TUL. L. REV. 1461 (2002) (discussing racial discrimination in large, publicly held
corporations); Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public
Functions: Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323 (1999) (examining
how at times companies do not adequately serve those individuals who are
dependent on the companies for essential services); Cheryl L. Wade, Racial
Discrimination and the Relationship Between the Directorial Duty of Care and
Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389 (2002) (analyzing the responses of
corporate executives when faced with allegations of racial discrimination); Cheryl L.
Wade, The Impact of U.S. Corporate Policy on Women and People of Color, 7 J.
GENDER RACE & JUST. 213 (2003) (discussing the implications of corporate policies
for people of color and for women).
3 I have used several excellent law review articles dealing with race and
business issues with consistent success in my Law and Race seminar and another
seminar on issues in race, gender and the law. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Mitu
Gulati, Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1262-63 (2000) (examining the
conduct of employees of color to determine the effectiveness of antidiscrimination
law); Steven A. Ramirez, The New Cultural Diversity and Title VII, 6 MICH. J. RACE
& L. 127, 131-41 (2000) (analyzing diversity initiatives undertaken by businesses);
Susan Sturm, Rethinking Law in the Twenty.First Century Workplace: Article &
Essay: Race, Gender and the Law in the Twenty-First Century Workplace: Some
Preliminary Observations, 1 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 639, 685 (1998) (proposing
legal reform that responds to organizational and demographic changes in the
workplace).
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felt safe and free from "liberal" politics and discussions. Being
an African American woman, I felt strangely vulnerable during
these discussions. 4 It was obvious to my students, of course, that
the issues we discussed were deeply personal to me. The
experience of talking about race in a corporations course with an
African American woman flew in the face of what they had been
told by many of their law teachers: that the study of law is an
examination of objective and neutral principles. 5
Professor Paulette M. Caldwell, an African American woman
who taught law while she wore her hair in braids, gave a
poignant account of the personal costs of discussing an
employment discrimination case brought by an African American
woman that "upheld the right of employers to prohibit
categorically the wearing of braided hairstyles in the
workplace." 6
I resented being the unwitting object of one in thousands of
law school hypotheticals.
... I was not prepared to adopt an abstract, dispassionate,
objective stance to an issue that so obviously affected me
personally; nor was I prepared to suffer publicly, through
intense and passionate advocacy, the pain and outrage that I
experience each time a black woman is dismissed, belittled, and
ignored simply because she challenges our objectification. 7
Caldwell describes her procrastination in answering a
student who inquired about the fairness of the court's decision
about braided hairstyles. "I could not think of an answer that
would be certain to observe traditional boundaries in academic
discourse between the personal and the professional. '8
4 See generally Deborah Waire Post, Reflections on Identity, Diversity, and
Morality, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 136 (1990-91), for an interesting account of the
vulnerability, both in the classroom and among colleagues, of an African American
woman who teaches law.
5 "Most mainstream scholars embrace universalism over particularity, abstract
principles and the 'rule of law' over perspectivism (an approach characterized by an
emphasis on concrete personal experience).... [U]niversal, neutral
principles... can be more of a hindrance than a help in the search for racial
justice." CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE CUTTING EDGE xv (Richard Delgado ed.,
1995).
6 Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race
and Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 366.
7 Id. at 368-69.
8 Id. at 369.
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For some of my corporations and corporate accountability
students, our brief discussions of race theory may have been
their first introduction to a critical look at the law that explores
some of the personal and subjective elements that critical legal
scholars suggest are part of legal analysis. 9 Some white students
seemed uncomfortable with these discussions. They were
reticent and exceedingly careful about participating in the
conversation. I suspected that they did not want to say anything
that would offend me or their colleagues of color. Worse yet was
the small number of students who seemed rudely disinterested,
waiting ostentatiously for me to get on with the "real" issues of
corporate law.
I. WHY DISCUSS RACE IN COURSES AND SEMINARS THAT ARE
NOT ABOUT RACE?
There are many reasons to discuss race in courses and
seminars that are not devoted primarily to race issues.10
Professor Dorothy A. Brown has written an excellent casebook in
which she examines race in the first-year curriculum.1 Her
casebook, with a separate chapter devoted to each first-year
subject, analyzes cases from a critical race theory perspective.
I have concluded that it is important to discuss race
whenever relevant because my students will practice law in a
society in which racism is ubiquitous but not always apparent
and recognizable. Professor Richard Delgado, in the introduction
to his critical race theory anthology, explains one insight of
critical race theorists "that racism is normal, not aberrant, in
American society. Because racism is an ingrained feature of our
landscape, it looks ordinary and natural to persons in the
culture."12 Delgado explains that there are "business-as-usual
forms of racism that people of color confront every day and that
account for much misery, alienation, and despair."'13 Ignoring
issues of race in the law school's core courses and relegating such
issues to Law and Race and Critical Race Theory seminars
9 "[Mlany [Critical Race Theory] writers urge attention to the details of
minorities' lives as a foundation for our national civil rights strategy." Id.
10 DOROTHY A. BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS AND
PROBLEMS (forthcoming Oct. 2003).
11 Id.
12 CRITICAL RACE THEORY, supra note 5, at xiv.
13 Id.
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disserves my students. Discussions of race become
marginalized, 14 exiled to the fringes of the law school curriculum.
Only the students who enroll in "race courses" have available
opportunities to discuss race and racism.
This tendency in law school to discuss race only in specified
courses trivializes the experiences of students of color and the
importance of race in American society. Ignoring race in core
courses squanders precious opportunities for students who do
not take "race courses" to learn to speak intelligently about the
important and difficult issues of race and racism. Students will
function as judges, lawyers, counselors, mediators, and
negotiators in a society where few are able to speak comfortably
and capably about race issues even though racism is pervasive
and ubiquitous. Race and racism are complex issues that are
perforated with minefields that few Americans are able to
negotiate.1 5 "Race is a tense terrain, where we often try to hide
crucial truths from ourselves. One way to bring these premises
to the surface is by making them as vivid as possible." 16 It is my
14 Richard Delgado has written about the marginalization of the writing of
scholars of color. See Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a
Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 561, 561-62 (1984); Richard
Delgado, "The Imperial Scholar" Revisited: How to Marginalize Outsider Writing,
Ten Years Later, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349-51 (1992). "Even though the new
voices are finding their way into the pages of the top reviews and journals, they are
not being quickly and easily integrated into the conversations and dialogues of
traditional legal scholarship." Id. at 1368.
15 "[R]acism in America is much more complex than either the conscious
conspiracy of a power elite or the simple delusion of a few ignorant bigots." Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious
Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 330 (1987). "Decades into the experiment of
integration, race still infuses our quotidian interactions, remaining a source of
misunderstanding and enlightenment, alienation and togetherness." Talking About
Race, N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at F25. The New York Times examined race and
racism in a series of articles that demonstrated the enormity and complexity of the
racial dilemma in American society. One of the reporters who worked on the series
asked, 'Why is race a more sensitive subject than sex or sexual orientation or
ethnicity?" Sam Roberts, The Way We Live Now: 7-16-00: Round Table; Writing
About Race (And Trying to Talk About It), N.Y. TIMES, July 16, 2000, at F16.
Another reporter working on the same series responded:
Labels get affixed to people for saying "the wrong thing." It may be unfair
but it's true. If a guy says something about women he can jokingly say,
"Well, I'm just a chauvinist, I'm just a chauvinist pig," and make a joke out
of it. I don't think you run across anybody who would jokingly refer to
himself as a racist. It's such a radioactive subject because these labels are
so explosive. I mean, you know-bigot, Uncle Tom, sell out-you name it.
Id.
16 ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE,
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hope that law schools graduate as many students as possible
that will be able to take the lead in the difficult discourse about
race.
II. WHY DISCUSS RACE IN BUSINESS AND CORPORATE LAW
COURSES AND SEMINARS?
In 1992, Andrew Hacker wrote a book that offered his
"understanding of the role and meaning of race in the
contemporary United States."1 7 Hacker paints a dismal picture
of the disturbing economic disparities between African
Americans and whites. "Since their first arrival, and continuing
after they started receiving wages, black Americans have figured
disproportionately among the nation's poor."18  In a chapter
entitled "The Racial Income Gap," he writes: "[A] greater
proportion of black Americans lack regular employment than at
any time since the 1930s Depression. '"19 In another chapter
called "Equity in Employment," Hacker reveals that only "2.4
percent of the country's corporations, partnerships, and sole
proprietorships" are owned by African Americans. 20 He explains
that the reason may be attributed to "the difficulty of getting
start-up loans and capital from banks and investors stemming
from biased attitudes about blacks' business abilities. Nor is it
easy for blacks to get experience in corporate management as a
prelude to branching out on their own."21 In the same chapter,
Hacker explores racial bias on the part of companies that choose
to open facilities in almost all-white areas and otherwise
discriminate against African Americans when making hiring and
promotion decisions. 22
More than a decade later, African Americans are far from
achieving economic parity with white Americans. In 2001, the
average household income of African Americans was 64.9% of
the average household income of white Americans. 23 "Black men
UNEQUAL x (1992).
17 Id. at ix.
18 Id. at 93.
19 Id. at 105.
20 Id. at 108.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 117-18, 133.
23 See Roger 0. Crockett & Peter Coy, Progress Without Parity: Fewer Are Poor,
but Blacks Are No Closer to Economic Equality, Bus. WK., July 14, 2003, at 99.
"[P]rogress in narrowing the economic divide between blacks and whites has
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earned 73.9% of what white men earned in 2002 .... Black
female earnings actually lost a bit of ground ... compared with
those of white women" in the last ten years. 24 Recent increases
in unemployment have disproportionately affected both
professional and blue-collar African Americans. 25
I have asked my students in Corporate Governance and
Accountability to make the connection for themselves between
economic disparities among racial groups in the United States
and the social irresponsibility of corporate citizens that
discriminate. The underlying theme of these discussions is that
the way corporations are governed is relevant to many of the
racial inequities that persist in the United States. Corporate
governance reform and organizational change may begin to close
the economic gap between whites and minorities in America.
Specifically, if companies monitor their employees' compliance
with anti-discrimination law, they may begin to mitigate some of
the economic effects of employment discrimination. These
conclusions are implicit in the statistical evidence of workplace
discrimination in hiring, promotion, and pay that I give my
students. For example, I tell my students that "[b]lack
managers and executives are ... paid less than whites in
similar jobs," and that "black male executives and managers
earn 23% less than white ones."26
I see race discrimination as a corporate governance issue
because directorial failure to monitor compliance with
antidiscrimination laws reduces rather than maximizes
shareholder wealth. 27 Companies that discriminate often pay
large amounts to settle class actions brought by employees or
consumers of color alleging that boards breached duties of care
in failing to avoid the losses incurred when settling
stalled...." Roger 0. Crockett, How to Narrow the Great Divide, BUS. WK., July 14,
2003, at 104.
24 Crockett & Coy, supra note 23, at 99.
25 See id.; see also Louis Uchitelle, Blacks Lose Better Jobs Faster as Middle-
Class Work Drops, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2003, at Al (discussing the unemployment
rate and its disproportionate affect on African Americans across the country, despite
their persistence in staying in the workforce).
26 Crockett & Coy, supra note 23, at 102.
27 See Cheryl L. Wade, Racial Discrimination and the Relationship Between the
Directorial Duty of Care and Corporate Disclosure, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 389, 389-90
(2002) (stating that these breaches seriously harm the economic interests of
shareholders in the short term and may also affect the long term profitability of the
corporation and shareholders).
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discrimination suits.28 It is also appropriate to discuss these
issues in Corporate Governance and Accountability because
corporate governance refers to how decisions are made within
publicly-traded companies. 29 My hope is that the decisions made
by my former students who become corporate lawyers,
managers, or directors will not adversely affect constituencies of
color on whom corporate activity has a significant impact. My
goal is for those concerned about the way companies
discriminate to understand the ways to hold such firms
accountable.
Several alarming events have eclipsed national discourse on
race and racism in American society. In the immediate
aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States, few
American citizens thought about any of the pressing issues that
were so important on September 10, 2001 and before. In the
months that followed, the nation became preoccupied with
terrorism, homeland security, and other global matters such as
issues relating to Iraq, North Korea, and Liberia. In the
aftermath of accounting scandals that bankrupted companies
such as Enron and WorldCom, almost all political, legal, and
social discussion of corporate activity, corporate law, and
corporate governance relates to financial disclosure and
accounting matters. Few are focused in a substantial way on the
impact of racism within public companies and its effect on
employees, consumers, suppliers, and communities of color.
Even though we find it difficult to talk about, racism persists. It
has changed foria to some extent, but its effect remains
unmitigated. For these reasons, I aspire to break the nation's
silence on race matters by discussing them in class.
III. CHANGING SCHOOLS; CHANGING TIMES
I began my teaching career at Hofstra University where
most students felt compelled to take the basic corporations
course even though it was not a prerequisite for graduation. Of
course, they were absolutely right in doing so. This general
consensus, however, that one must study basic corporate law,
28 See id. at 389 (discussing recent cases where large settlements were paid to
minority employees alleging racial discrimination and the fiduciary duties to
shareholders breached because of these settlements).
29 See DAVID SCIULLI, CORPORATE POWER IN CIVIL SOCIETY 10 (2001) (defining
"corporate governance").
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resulted in huge corporations classes where many students
learned for the first time about the ways men and women do
business and the law that applies to them. One year, I stood
before approximately 170 students. If I had to measure the
interest of each of my students in corporate law by the look on
his or her face on the first day of class, I would say that slightly
more than half of my students were not interested. The
challenge in teaching this course was to inspire in my students a
level of interest in business law that extended beyond copious
note taking in order to get a decent grade in a class that was
worth four credits. To do this, I had to understand some of the
reasons why large numbers of students were not interested,
much less enthusiastic, about corporate law. My conversations
with many of these students have induced me to devote several
hours of the semester to discussions of corporate social
responsibility, fairness, justice, and communitarianism.
Some students have told me that they prefer courses in
family law or criminal law rather than corporate law courses
because they prefer to deal with people. These students become
more interested in corporate law when I emphasize the fact that
corporate law is about people and the rules and principles that
govern their relationships when they do business in the
corporate form. This leads to a discussion of the theories of what
a corporation is.30 While many students are comfortable and
familiar with the notion of a corporation as an artificial entity
with a legal identity that is separate from its owners and
managers, I stress for those who find this notion difficult to
understand the fact that corporate law primarily deals with the
people who own and manage the corporation. I let them know on
30 Generally, I lecture on the topic of what a corporation is, pulling from a
variety of sources. See, e.g., Henry N. Butler, The Contractual Theory of the
Corporation, 11 GEO. MASON L. REV. 99, 99 (1989) (discussing the view of "the firm
as a 'nexus of contracts' among participants"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 700 (1982) (describing
the corporation as a "web of agency relationships"); Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate
Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective, 18 J. CORP. L. 185, 185
(1993) (discussing the value of "[a]pplying basic economic analysis to the corporate
form"); David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 262
(discussing how theories of the corporation have developed and changed over the
last century); Alan Wolfe, The Modern Corporation: Private Agent or Public Actor?,
50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1673, 1696 (1993) (discussing the proper mixture of a
corporation's public and private responsibilities).
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the first day of class that corporate law is about human
relationships. 31
A negative public perception of corporations and corporate
lawyers is the source of another kind of challenge for those who
teach large basic corporations courses.32 Some of my students
share this negative perception, concluding that notions of social,
civic, and ethical responsibility, fairness, and justice play no part
in the study of corporate law. It is for this reason that I spend
some class time explaining that corporate law is about
responsibility to and fairness and justice for directors, officers,
shareholders, and even potential investors. It is during this
explanation that I introduce the duties of care and loyalty owing
from directors to shareholders as an example of responsibility to
shareholders. An introduction to the disclosure rules found in
the Securities Act of 1933 3 and the Securities Exchange Act of
193434 illustrates fairness principles that benefit the investing
public through mandatory disclosure for their protection. I
introduce the business judgment rule to demonstrate that courts
defer to their business decisions, if made diligently and in good
faith, as a matter of fairness to corporate directors and officers. 35
In attempting to keep the discussion balanced, I also discuss the
business judgment rule as a practice of judicial deference for the
economic benefit of shareholders. Courts do not second-guess
the decisions of corporate officers and directors because they
want to encourage risk-taking-as long as it is not grossly
negligent-that will enhance shareholder wealth.36
This discussion about duty, deference, and disclosure,
however, is not enough for many students whose ideas about
31 It is important to introduce this perspective to students who will become
corporate litigators. One commentator advised defense lawyers representing
corporate clients that "putting a human face on a client may gain some mileage"
with jurors. John Gibeaut, Softening up Client Appeal" A.B.A. J., July 2003, at 28.
32 See generally RALPH NADER & WESLEY J. SMITH, NO CONTEST: CORPORATE
LAWYERS AND THE PERVERSION OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA (1996); Arthur W.
Samansky, TV Commercials: The SOB in the Gray-Flannel Suit, WALL ST. J., Nov.
15, 1988, at A22 (stating that "[e]xecutive-bashing has been a film maker's staple
almost from the day the camera was invented").
33 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (2000).
34 Id. § 78. The purpose of this statute was to protect investors' interests by
making disclosure of certain information mandatory. See id. § 78(8).
35 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 887 (2d Cir. 1982) (applying the
business judgment rule).
36 Id. at 885-86 (stating that sometimes the better choice may involve the risky
option because it will most likely lead to a balance between gains and losses).
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responsibility, justice, and fairness extend beyond what is
equitable among the parties who look to the corporate form as a
way to do business and make money. What about the rest of the
world, they ask. They, of course, are concerned about the groups
of people who are not shareholders, officers, or directors, but who
are affected by corporate activity in significant and sometimes
profound ways. These students are sometimes enticed by the
consideration of nonshareholder constituencies and our
deliberation about corporate responsibility that extends to
employees, suppliers, and the communities in which companies
do business. I let my students know that there is something for
everyone. Feminists,37 environmentalists, 3 and civil and human
rights activists39 can find fulfillment in the study of corporate
law.
A good number of students find an irresolvable level of
incongruity in the notion of using corporate law as a tool for
social justice. A discussion of the corporate lawyer's role in
making sure that senior officers and directors do what they must
in order to ensure corporate compliance with the law helps to
resolve the contradiction that some students find inherent in the
idea of using corporate law to ensure justice. To some extent,
this is a discussion about corporate social responsibility, but
there is more to it. This discussion is also about diligently
ensuring compliance with law as a matter of justice.
Some of the disclosure rules under the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 provide an opportunity to discuss corporate law as a
means to achieving social justice. A contextualized discussion of
these rules also makes the consideration of introductory
securities regulation less abstract and more manageable for
students. I have asked my students to read Item 103 of
Regulation S-K of the Exchange Act.40  We discuss the
mandatory disclosure of legal proceedings that arise under
37 We consider Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which prohibits sex
discrimination in employment. Section 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000).
38 We discuss the Securities and Exchange Commission's environmental
disclosure rules under its integrated disclosure system. See, e.g., Adoption of
Integrated Disclosure System, 47 Fed. Reg. 11,380, 11,381 (Mar. 16, 1982).
39 For this discussion, we read some of the cases analyzing the social issue
proposals submitted by shareholders who are concerned about corporate
infringement upon civil and human rights. See, e.g., Amalgamated Clothing and
Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
40 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,001 et seq.
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environmental law and the fact that under Item 103 only
proceedings that are economically significant need be disclosed.
After considering the concept of materiality, we go on to discuss
the goals of these mandatory disclosure requirements-the
achievement of environmental justice by making transparent
corporate activity that has potentially deleterious environmental
consequences. 41 After considering the concept of materiality, we
next discuss the goal of these mandatory disclosure
requirements: The achievement of environmental justice by
making transparent the corporate activity that has potentially
deleterious environmental consequences. We also look at Item
303 of Regulation S-K and its requirement that companies
disclose potential environmental liability. 42 We discuss the fact
that only material potential expenditures need to be disclosed
and also ask whether the materiality requirement undermines
the accomplishment of true environmental justice. This leads to
a discussion of the time and cost burdens that would be placed
on issuers if the materiality factor was dropped.
I emphasize that while this is a discussion focused on
corporate social responsibility, it is responsibility that is
mandated by law. I make the point by comparing mandatory
environmental disclosure rules to voluntary corporate codes of
conduct that relate to the environment, such as the Valdez
Principles. "The Valdez Principles asked corporations to go
beyond mere compliance with the minimum environmental
standards set by federal, state, and local governments and
aggressively protect the environment. ' '43 This enables students
to understand that while compliance with the law ensures social
justice and responsibility, there is another kind of corporate
social responsibility, which asks businesses to go beyond that
which is required under the law to ensure the benefit of certain
constituencies.
After discussing environmental disclosure rules as a way of
encouraging compliance with the law, I ask students to consider
the mandatory disclosure of material proceedings that relate to
civil rights matters. I ask students why there is no civil rights
analogue to the requirement that potential environmental
41 [2003] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 71,001.
42 Id. 1 71,033.
43 Elizabeth Glass Geltman & Andrew E. Skroback, Environmental Activism
and the Ethical Investor, 22 J. CORP. L. 465, 498-99 (1997).
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expenditures be disclosed under Item 303. In other words, why
doesn't the SEC require the disclosure of potential civil rights
expenditures? This leads to an interesting discussion about the
differences between social commitment to improving the
environment and its commitment to helping in the enforcement
of the civil rights of women, minorities, and the disabled.
Another part of my discussion of legally mandated corporate
social responsibility includes the directorial duty of care. 44 For
this discussion, I spend some time focusing on the duty-to-
monitor component of the duty of care. My students read an
excerpt of Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co., 45 in
which the company incurred large financial losses as a result of
having violated antitrust laws. 46 Because the directors were not
on notice that some employees were part of a price-fixing
conspiracy, the Delaware Supreme Court held that they owed no
duty to investigate or monitor employee behavior in this
regard. 47
Three decades later, the Delaware Chancery Court defended
the result in Allis-Chalmers, narrowly interpreting the case "as
standing for the proposition that, absent grounds to suspect
deception, neither corporate boards nor senior officers can be
charged with wrongdoing simply for assuming the integrity of
employees and the honesty of their dealings on the company's
behalf."48  I ask my students to think about the nature of a
director's duty. I explain to them that outside directors have
their own jobs. How can they be expected to monitor the
decisions made by officers and employees that they may never
meet? I then call their attention to the fact that employee
decision making that does not comply with the law may cause
significant financial losses. I direct my students' attention to the
cases enumerated by Chancellor Allen in Caremark where the
decisions of officers and employees deep "in the interior of the
44 This discussion occurs after focusing on the duty-of-care cases that explore
directors' responsibility to make business decisions only after careful consideration
and due deliberation. See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885-86 (2d Cir. 1982);
Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985); Kamin v. Am. Express Co.,
86 Misc. 2d 809, 812-14, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807, 810-11 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
45 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963).
46 See id. at 127-28.
47 See id. at 128-29, 131.
48 In re Caremark Int'l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 969 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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organization... vitally affect the welfare of the corporation." 49
In Caremark, Chancellor Allen recalled debacles at Salomon,
Inc., Kidder, Peabody, and Prudential Insurance, where
corporate losses resulted from the illegal conduct of employees
that arguably should have been monitored more closely. 50 A
question for my students is the question posed by Chancellor
Allen: "[W]hat is the board's responsibility with respect to the
organization and monitoring of the enterprise to assure that the
corporation functions within the law to achieve its purposes?"51
After discussing the Caremark decision, which held that
directors owe a duty to make a good faith attempt to install an
adequate monitoring system to ensure corporate compliance with
the law, I inform my students that in recent years corporate law
compliance has become a significant undertaking for managers
in light of general legal obligations which are far more numerous
than those in place when Allis-Chalmers was decided. 52 At this
point, I remind my students of the racial discrimination class
action that was settled by Texaco in 1996.53 I highlight the
social responsibility and justice issues that are inherent in a
consideration of whether directors have breached their duty of
care when they fail to monitor their employees' compliance with
anti-discrimination law.54 I ask the students to consider whether
the Texaco directors breached their duty of care when they failed
to adequately monitor alleged racial discrimination, which
resulted in over $175 million paid to settle the race
discrimination class action. 55
By the time I have this discussion of race discrimination at
large public companies such as Texaco, my students are less
surprised by our consideration of race matters in a corporations
course. The discussion of race has been prefaced with earlier
discussions of the notion that fairness and justice are underlying
49 Id. at 968.
50 See id. at 968-69.
51 See id.
52 1 now include discussions concerning the changing obligations of corporate
lawyers, boards, and senior officers under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was
enacted in 2002 in reaction to fraudulent financial disclosures at companies such as
Enron and WorldCom. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116
Stat. 745.
53 See Jack E. White, Texaco's High Octane Racism Problems: Piles of Cash and
Substantial Reforms Fail to Reverse the Call for Boycott, TIME, Nov. 25, 1996, at 33.
54 See Wade, supra note 27, at 391-92.
55 See White, supra note 52, at 33.
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themes of, and justifications for, disclosure rules to protect
investors and the business judgment rule for the protection of
directors. We have already discussed corporate social
responsibility and environmental justice. Race and racism
within large public companies is simply a continuation of the
theme with which we started at the beginning of the semester.
The Texaco case comes up again later in the semester when
we talk about disclosure under the federal securities laws. I ask
students to consider whether things would have worked out
differently for Texaco if Regulation S-K called for disclosure of
potential material liability under civil rights laws as is required
for potential environmental liability. Shouldn't investors know
about this kind of conduct that could lead to huge financial loss?
Would such disclosure, or the possibility of having to make such
disclosure, have inspired corporate managers to do something
about the alleged race discrimination? I distinguish corporate
responsibility that is mandated by law from the typical
discussion of corporate social responsibility that asks businesses
to achieve social good even when it is not required by law. Cases
on charitable contributions and corporate entities behaving as
good citizens lead nicely into a discussion of the corporate social
responsibility goals that require more than compliance with the
law and the tension between shareholder wealth-maximization
and achieving social good.
I discuss with my students a context in which the tension
between social responsibility and shareholder wealth-
maximization is exacerbated. We consider the assumption by
private, for-profit corporations of certain public functions, such
as educating children, imprisoning those accused of crime, and
distributing social services benefits. These companies are
atypical because they engage in businesses where human beings
are the source of shareholder profit. When private companies
manage prisons, public schools, and distribute welfare benefits,
the inmates, students, and welfare recipients they purport to
serve become human commodities who are more like the widgets
manufactured by more typical corporations than they are like
the constituencies of traditional companies.5 6 A discussion of
these companies vividly illustrates the inherent conflict between
56 See Cheryl L. Wade, For-Profit Corporations That Perform Public Functions:
Politics, Profit, and Poverty, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 323, 325 (1999).
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shareholder wealth-maximization goals and the interests of the
people who rely on these companies. These companies engage in
businesses that have a profound effect, not only on the students,
prisoners, and indigents they serve, but also on society in
general. The entire nation relies on the adequate provision of
the services these companies render. 57 When these companies
educate, incarcerate, and distribute social service benefits, they
establish social policy.
A discussion of for-profit companies that assume functions
traditionally performed by the government enables me to clarify
the nature of the relationships between the various
nonshareholder constituencies with the corporate entity. I do so
by comparing the students and prisoners in the schools and
prisons run by for-profit companies, the overwhelming majority
of whom are people of color, to traditional nonshareholder
constituencies. They are unlike the consumers, creditors,
suppliers, and employees associated with the average
corporation. I call them corporate dependents. They lack the
bargaining power that most corporate constituents have.58 They
are unable to choose alternatives when they are dissatisfied.
The relationship between corporate dependents and the
companies on which they rely is custodial in nature. 59 These
companies control the very lives of corporate dependents. The
power of for-profit companies over corporate dependents is
especially evident in the context of prison privatization where
the state's authority to control and intercede in individuals' lives
is handed over to private companies. 60
CONCLUSION
It is important for me to convey to my students that the
work of a corporate lawyer need not be antithetical to a life's
57 Cf. William H. Rentschler, "Lock 'Em Up and Throw Away the Key"- A Policy
That Won't Work, USA TODAY, Nov. 1997, at 24. Rentschler writes that when many
prisoners are released they are "bereft of all hope[] and trained only to continue
along the path of crime. Their aim is to get out and get even. Society bears the
burden." Id.
58 See Wade, supra note 55, at 325-26.
69 See id. at 342.
60 For-profit companies have traditionally provided specific services to inmates.
The provision of food, health care, and education are examples of for-profit
involvement that should be distinguished from prison privatization, which involves
the transfer of ownership and control of entire facilities.
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work devoted to social responsibility and racial justice.
Corporate lawyers can practice corporate law and achieve social
good. Corporate lawyers can move their clients closer to
achieving racial equity for the various constituencies that are
affected by corporate activity. In this Article, I suggest that we
teach corporate law and governance in a way that is consistent
with enhancing corporate social responsibility and racial justice.
In the classroom, however, at least when it comes to race
matters, I am not always able to do so.
Many law teachers of color have described the importance,
rewards, and difficulties of talking about race in the classroom. 61
For some, efforts to undertake such discussions have yielded
impressively positive outcomes. Professor Paulette Caldwell
wrote of her success in discussing a case about a black woman
plaintiff with braided hair in a style similar to the one worn by
Caldwell at the time after initially having been hesitant to have
the discussion in her Employment Discrimination course:
Our silence broken, the class moved beyond hierarchy to a
place of honest collaboration. Turning to [the case], we
explored the question of our ability to comprehend
through the medium of experience the way in which a
black woman's hair is related to the perpetuation of
social, political, and economic domination of subordinated
racial and gender groups; we asked why issues of
experience, culture, and identity are not the subject of
explicit legal reasoning.62
I have had some success in discussing race in corporations
courses and seminars. I have had some spectacular failures,
however, that were followed by a year or two in which I could not
bring myself to discuss race in my corporations courses and
seminars.63
61 See Frances Lee Ansley, Race and the Core Curriculum in Legal Education,
79 CAL. L. REV. 1511, 1512-13 (1991); Taunya Lovell Banks, Teaching Laws with
Flaws: Adopting a Pluralistic Approach to Torts, 57 MO. L. REV. 443, 445-47 (1992);
Okianer Christian Dark, Incorporating Issues of Race, Gender, Class, Sexual
Orientation, and Disability into Law School Teaching, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 541,
542 (1996); Amy H. Kastely, Out of the Whiteness: On Raced Codes and White Race
Consciousness in Some Tort, Criminal, and Contract Law, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 269,
314-15 (1994).
62 See Caldwell, supra note 6, at 366.
63 For example, one year my questions about corporate compliance with anti-
discrimination law that prohibits race discrimination were met with a stony silence.
Not one of my eighty or so students that year raised a hand. The following year, I
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approached the same discussion about compliance with law focusing on sex
discrimination and harassment rather than race discrimination and harassment. I
had much better results. Students were eager to discuss the same corporate
compliance issues as they related to women.
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